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This paper is concerned with making sense of current ways of explaining housing policy. Four 
different types of explanation are identified and analysed in detail: explanations in terms of 
systems of actors, hypothetico-deductive explanations, realist explanations, and culturalist 
explanations. The characteristic ontology and epistemology of each type of explanation is made 
explicit. The four types of explanation are then evaluated, partly in their own terms, and partly 
in relation to each other. It is argued that explanations in terms of systems of actors are 
inherently superficial, so it is essential to go beyond and below them in order to achieve an 
acceptable level of explanatory adequacy. Hypothetico-deductive explanations are rescued from 
realist and culturalist criticisms which tend to dismiss them altogether, but they are recognised 
as having serious limitations in terms of conceptual vagueness/ambiguity and contextual 
fragmentation. Realist explanations are considered in greater depth through an examination of 
regulation theory. This examination amounts to a critique of the theory as regards its application 
to housing policy. Finally, culturalist explanations are assessed by using Kemeny's theory as an 
illustration, with both ontological and epistemological problems being identified. The paper 
concludes with an evaluation of the logical relations and differences between explanations of the 
four different types. 
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THE NATURE AND CLASSIFICATION OF HOUSING POLICY 
Policy used to be defined in terms of the political intentions of decision making elites 
(Jenkins, 1978). Such an approach makes elitist theories of political power true by 
definition. More recently, therefore, writers have pointed to the existence of 
continuity between policy and action or implementation (Barrett and Fudge, 1981; 
Means, 1993). The question of whether a policy process is dominated by elites is 
then to be resolved by empirical investigation. 
Policy, then, can be defined in terms of the positions and actions of decision makers 
and of those who are responsible for carrying out their decisions. Public 
policy can now be defined as the policy of public bodies such as governments, 
statutory authorities, and corporations, and housing policy can be defined as public 
policy in relation to housing. This paper is concerned with housing policy as an 
element or dimension of public policy, and more specifically with the housing policy 
of state institutions. 
State policy (the policy of state institutions) does not fall neatly into a number of 
different categories, because there are inevitable and substantial overlaps between 
social policy, economic policy, urban policy, regional policy, fiscal policy, monetary 
policy, employment policy, and so on. In singling out state housing policy, 
therefore, we must be careful not to miss its intimate links with these other aspects 
of state policy. In addition, it has been argued by Houlihan (1988, p. 31) that there 
is no unified policy area for housing itself, but only a number of overlapping policy 
areas. We must also be careful, therefore, not to assume that there is any internal 
coherence to state housing policy as such. 
This paper is concerned with the explanation of state housing policy. In general 
terms, this means the identification of a conceptual framework within which the 
state's positions and actions can be shown to have a certain logic or to fit into a 
certain type of pattern. The idea is that making this logic or patterning explicit could 
help to make better sense of the policy process, and therefore enable more effective 
contributions to policy reform. It is possible that a generally agreed typology of state 
housing policies would be helpful in terms of clarifying what it is that needs to be 
explained. In practice, however, there is no such general agreement: typologies can 
be devised, for example, on the basis of structures of housing provision (Ambrose, 
1991, 1992; Ball and Harloe, 1992), administrative/professional convenience, or 
housing tenure (see examples at the end of this paper). Since theoretical support for 
these typologies is weak or lacking, the result is as much distortion as clarification 
of housing policy processes. Fortunately, however; it is not necessary to develop 
typologies as a precondition for explaining housing policy. 
The aims of this paper are relatively modest. I am concerned not so much with 
explaining housing policy in itself as with identifying and evaluating a number of 
types of explanation that are found in housing policy studies. The intention is that 
such evaluation should help to guide future attempts to explain housing policy. The 
argument is conducted at a relatively abstract level, because the aim is to focus on 
the most general presuppositions of each theoretical approach. The next section 
identifies four general types of explanation, and the section after that concentrates 
on their evaluation. 
TYPES OF EXPLANATION OF HOUSING POLICY 
It may be as .difficult to construct a generally agreed typology of explanations of 
housing policy as of housing policies. Nevertheless, certain broad perspectives do 
emerge in the literature, and it is these which are the subject of this paper. The 
selection of these perspectives is not entirely arbitrary, because it is guided by a 
conception of the primary purposes of explanation in social science generally (and 
possibly in natural science as well). These purposes are, broadly speaking, ontological, 
epistemoiogical, and methodological: ontological, because explanations make 
assumptions about the nature of what is to be explained; epistemological, because 
explanations need to be clear about the nature of the knowledge which they are 
seeking; and methodological, because explanations need to be explicit about the ways 
in which such "knowledge is to be acquired. On the basis of this classification of 
purposes, this [paper claims that it is possible to throw some light on different 
theoretical perspectives, and hence improve the quality of explanation in this field. 
This paper identifies four types of explanation of housing policy. The selection is 
arbitrary in at least two respects: firstly, it is possible that there exist other types of 
explanation which cannot be subsumed under any of those selected; and secondly, 
it is possible that selected types could be divided into a number of sub-types, which 
could equally well be justified as separate types. The selection is non-arbitrary, 
however, insofar as the distinctive character of each type of explanation is determined 
by ontological, epistemological and methodological considerations. The four types 
in question are: (1) explanations in terms of "systems of actors" (Dunleavy, 1981); 
(2) hypothetico-deductive models of explanation (Hempel, 1962); (3) realist explanations 
(Bhaskar, 1978); and (4) culturalist explanations (Kemeny, 1992). Each of 
these types is considered in detail below. 
 (1) Explanations in terms of systems of actors " " 
The first type of explanation is selected as the most common type of explanation, of 
housing policy. The expression "system of actors" is taken from Dunleavy (1981), 
and this type of explanation is found in the work of Donnison and Ungerson 
(1982), Balchin (1989), Malpass and Murie (1990) and many others. This should '\\: 
\ 
not be taken to mean, however, that any of these writers necessarily identify 
themselves with it. One general characteristic of this approach is that explanations 
of housing policy are sought in terms of the relations between agents, whether 
human or institutional. I call such relations social relations. This type of explanation 
therefore assumes that the reality of housing policy is articulated through social 
relations. In technical terms, the ontology of this perspective consists of social 
relations. 
A second general characteristic of this approach is that it seeks to identify 
systems by means of empirical investigation and inductive generalisation. While hot 
being avowedly empiricist because it does not claim that all knowledge is derived 
from experience, it is nevertheless redolent of an empiricist position. The social 
relations involved may not be always observable (for example, relations of power 
and influence), but it is assumed that the patterns into which such relations fit must 
be observable in order to be real. This approach is therefore based on an inductive 
logic, and its epistemology can be labelled inductivist. In addition, and as one would 
expect, its methodology is predominantly descriptive and comparative. 
There are several variants of the systems of actors approach, depending upon the 
nature of the actors and systems under consideration. With respect to specifically 
political actors, for example, the two main variants are pluralism and elite theory. 
Writers on housing policy have commonly been critical of the former and sympathetic 
to the latter. Dunleavy, for example, has argued that pluralism cannot 
explain the scale and development of the high-rise boom (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 183), 
and has pointed to the existence of a "public housing apparatus" which is an elite 
grouping that was substantially cohesive and controlled many aspects of policy 
development (p. 183). Similarly, Houlihan (1988) has identified a public sector 
housing policy "community" in Britain which appears to be a set of overlapping 
political and professional cliques or elites. Housing policy is then to be explained in 
terms of the patterns of behaviour of such elite groups. 
Other housing policy texts do not always refer explicitly to elites, but their 
existence and importance is clearly implied. For example, Donnison and Ungerson 
see housing policy as a response to housing problems (Donnison and Ungerson, 
1982, p. Ill), but the housing problems of those excluded from the core of the 
political system tend not to elicit a policy response (pp. 192-3). Similarly, Bowley 
(1945) sees state action in terms of a number of reformers responding to a perceived 
housing "need" through a series of "experiments", as if policy were a purely technical 
matter of professional or scientific expertise. Balchin ( 1989) sees the prime actor's as 
being political parties organised within a national political system, so that housing 
policy becomes determined by the manifestos and programmes of ruling political 
parties. Again, Malpass and Murie (1990), while acknowledging class struggle as the 
"general backcloth" to the (housing) policy process, suggest that there may exist 
elites of politicians and administrators at both national and local levels who 
effectively control the whole operation. Finally, albeit rather differently, Ball and 
Harloe (1992) have characterised structures of housing provision as "combinations 
of social agents involved in housing provision that relate to each other in empirically observable 
ways" (p. 3)—a characterisation which is compatible with both 
elite theory and pluralism. 
(2) Hypothetico-deductive explanations 
Explanations of this type are less commonly found in the housing policy literature. 
Nevertheless, they are important because the type represents a model of scientific 
explanation which researchers are urged to emulate. The approach derives from the 
classic Popper-Hempel account of explanation, according to which phenomena are 
said to be explained if statements describing them are logically deduced from 
theoretical postulates or hypotheses (Hempel, 1962). For Popper and Hempel, 
explanation is the logical inverse of prediction. In most versions of this approach, 
the hypotheses or postulates are interlinked so as to form a system. A key 
characteristic of hypothetico-deductivism is therefore its assumption that explanation 
can be validated only if it can be interpreted in terms of processes of logical 
deduction. Consequently, the epistemology of this approach can be described as a 
form of deductivism, in contrast to the inductivism of the systems of actors approach. 
The hypotheses themselves can come from anywhere, so the ontological status of 
explanations of this type is uncertain. What is clear, however, is that this approach 
seeks to identify relations other than social relations, namely logical relations between 
structures and actions. Such relations can be characterised in general terms as 
analytically necessary relations between social relations. Methodologically, the 
approach involves the formulation of hypotheses and the analysis and testing of their 
consequences. 
In the study of housing policy, two variants of the hypothetico-deductive approach 
can be distinguished. In the first, or probabilistic, variant, which Dickens et al. ( 1985) 
define as the "systems approach" (p. 158), housing policy is characterised as a set 
of "outputs" which follow with greater or less probability from a set of inputs into 
the policy process. In the second, or deterministic, variant, an attempt is made to 
discover or invent the system of relationships among the inputs which is causally 
responsible for the observed outputs. This second variant is illustrated in the work 
of Dunleavy (1981), which attempted to establish the structural determination of the 
policy of high-rise housing provision in Britain. Dunleavy's approach explicitly goes 
beyond systems of actors to consider underlying relationships between different 
systems of social relations. This approach has similarities with a realist approach (see 
next paragraph), but for Dunleavy the link between structure and action is one of 
logical necessity rather than objectively real relations. 
(3) Realist explanations 
This type of explanation stems from the work of Bhaskar (1978, 1979, 1989, 
1991)—see also Sayer (1992). In application to housing policy, it is exemplified in 
the work of Dickens et al. (1985). Ontologically, realism assumes that the world is 
inherently structured, differentiated and changing. In the words of a leading 
exponent of the realist position, "realism .. . asserts that there are in fact structures 
and powers which generate phenomena independent of our experience of and access 
to such objects" (Dickens, 1992, p. 177). For realists, therefore, the real meaning of 
the world is hidden, and needs to be revealed by scientific investigation. The 
assumption is that there exist not only relations between phenomena such as social 
relations are, but also necessary relations between different sets of phenomenal 
relations. These necessary relations, however, are not the analytically necessary 
relations of the hypothetico-deductivists, but rather they are synthetically necessary 
relations: in other words, the necessity in question is not merely a product of 
definitions and logical deductions, but is an attribute of (material or social) reality. 
Realist epistemology follows directly from its ontology. Realism seeks, above all, 
knowledge of synthetically necessary relations, knowledge which will explain phenomenal 
relations by reference to their underlying causes. Methodologically, however, 
realism is compatible with a number of different approaches, of which perhaps two 
are worth mentioning here. One is that of Kantian transcendentalism (Kant, 1929), 
of which perhaps the best-known modern exponent is Harré (1972). According to 
this method, models of causal mechanisms are developed by processes of logical and 
practical reasoning, and their implications are then tested through examination of 
the phenomena to be explained. This method is much the same as that of 
hypothetico-deductivism. The second method derives from Hegel and Marx, and 
works according to a dialectical process of analysis and synthesis known as the method 
of articulation (Jessop, 1990). Explanatory structures are first identified in a simple 
and abstract form, and then a hierarchy of increasingly complex and concrete 
manifestations is derived by the dialectical process. For example, the Marxist category 
of labour appears first in the concept of abstract labour, and the capitalist form 
of wage-labour is derived at a later stage. The concept of abstract labour is seen 
as necessary in order to explain the phenomenal form, and this necessity is synthetic 
because dialectical logic cannot be reduced to formal or analytical logic. 
Examples of both of the above methodologies can be found in the literature on 
housing policy. The work of Dickens et al. (1985) illustrates the Kantian approach, 
with Class relations being selected as causal mechanisms, and with the causal model 
being developed through empirical and comparative research. The second, or 
dialectical, approach is dominated by regulation theory. Space does not permit a 
detailed treatment of regulation theory in this paper, so the reader is referred to 
Aglietta (1979), Lipietz (1985, 1986), de Vroey (1984), Boyer (1986), Jessop (1988, 
1990), Kotz (1990) and Dunford (1990). The main point is that regulation theory 
sees state policy as structured on the basis of regimes of accumulation which are 
associated with particular modes of social and economic regulation. In the aftermath 
of the Second World War, the so-called Fordist regime of accumulation, 
involving a systematic linkage between mass production and mass consumption, 
became increasingly dominant in the world, and the growth of mass state provision 
(such as mass housing) was necessary to secure this linkage. 
Recently, there have been a number of attempts to apply regulation theory to 
housing processes and policies (Florida and Feldman, 1988; Chouinard, 1989, 
1990a, 1990Ô; Kennett 1992, 1993; see also Stoker, 1989). Generally, state formation 
is seen as part of a process of class formation (Chouinard, 1989, p. 390), and 
specific state policies are explained as outcomes of class conflicts structured by 
particular modes of social regulation (Chouinard, 1990a, p. 1294): modes of 
regulation provide means of institutionalising class struggle (Jessop, 1988, p. 150). 
Similar themes can be found in the work of realist writers who are not explicitly 
regulationists: for example, Dickens et al. (1985) explained the level of council 
housing provision in each locality as being produced by a local authority's own 
particular way of regulating its local class relations, and they attempted to explain 
differences between British and Swedish housing provision in terms of differences in 
state regulation of national housing structures. Although there are differences 
among regulation theorists (Jessop, 1990), as among realists generally, regulationist 
accounts all point to a broad shift from Fordism to post-Fordism, that is from a 
regime based on mass production-consumption to one based on "flexibility in 
relation to labour processes, labour markets, products and patterns of consumption" 
(Kennett, 1992, p. 5). This shift is then used to explain a variety of phenomena, from 
the history of suburbanisation in the USA (Florida and Feldman, 1988) to the failure 
of the cooperative movement in Canada (Chouinard, 1989, 19906) to the rise of 
gentrification and homelessness in a variety of countries (Kennett, 1992, 1993) or the 
change in British local government from a corporate management to a consumer oriented 
approach (Stoker, 1989). By extension, the rise and fall of mass high-rise 
housing provision, so well described by Dunleavy (1981), could be explained as a 
classic Fordjst project, a typical standardised product of that particular regime of 
accumulation, provided by a bureaucratic state to meet the housing needs of the 
"typical" working class family; in the post-Fordist era (so a regulationist would 
argue), such provision is neither necessary nor appropriate. 
(4) Culturalist explanations 
> 
Culturalism is the opposite of realism. The world is viewed not as having an inherent 
structure, but as a system of meanings which is culturally and historically variable. 
Policies are therefore generated on the basis of culturally-determined perceptions and 
ideologies, which are themselves responsible for defining the distinction between 
reality and ideality. Exponents of a culturalist approach include Kemeny (1992), 
"social construction of reality" theorists (Berger and Luckmann, 1984), and, by 
implication, symbolic interactionists or constructivists (Becker and McCall, 1990). 
Culturalist ontology, therefore, while not denying that there exists a reality "out 
there", presupposes that it is one which is entirely socially created. The elements of 
this reality are meanings, which are created, maintained and transformed through 
discourse and action. For culturalists, therefore, not only social relations but the 
relations between social relations are fundamentally contingent, not necessary. The 
knowability of different realms of meaning is then a function of the modes of 
discourse and action which have been culturally (and contingently) produced and 
developed over relatively long periods of time. Culturalist epistemology is thus 
virtually inseparable from culturalist ontology. 
Culturalist methodology is essentially hermeneutic, seeking an interpretive understanding 
of the social construction of social relations through human discourse and 
action. In practice, this means that there are probably as many culturalist methods 
as there are interpreters. In the field of housing, however, a common approach has 
been to identify how certain social problems and myths become politically salient. 
For example, a theme which occurs periodically, though not centrally, in most 
housing policy texts, such as Balchin (1989), Malpass and Murie (1990) and 
Donnison and Ungerson ( 1982), is the representation of housing policies as responses 
to dominant perceptions of "the housing problem". The assumption, usually 
implicit, is that the housing problem, however constructed, is part of a real world 
in which we all live, and not (as in the realist position) an epiphenomenon or 
idealisation which may or may not conceptualise an underlying structure of "real" 
social relations. A strict or "pure" culturalist approach would take the view that since 
the very distinction between idea and reality is culturally produced, and can only be 
culturally produced, housing policy can be explained only by reference to a wider 
context and patterning of social relations, without making any claims about the 
fundamental reality or unreality of the "housing problem" posed at any given 
historical conjuncture. Kemeny, for example, says: "/ see ideology as being not 
secondary or derivative of social formations but central to the way in which social 
institutions are constituted, sustained, and changed" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 85), and again, 
even more strongly: "society is the product of definitions of reality held by people, 
and... such definitions are sustained and changed through interpersonal interaction to 
become the basis for social action which in turn generates the social organisation that 
frames and limits future definition changes" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 100). 
The earliest applications of a culturalist approach in housing studies were 
actually in the 1970s, by those writing from a labelling theory perspective (Gill, 
1977; Shenton, 1976; Damer, 1974). In these studies, housing policy and practice 
were seen largely as a response to dominant perceptions of different housing areas 
and types of resident. The authors were concerned to argue that the nature and 
power of such perceptions were produced by a complex process of social interaction, 
and also that alternative perceptions were possible on the basis of more 
detailed investigation of the areas and residents involved. Primarily, the authors 
aimed to lay bare the processes of myth construction, and explode the myths as 
necessary. 
More recently, housing research from a culturalist perspective has emphasised the 
emotional energy associated with powerful myths influencing housing policy, such 
as the American myth of the yeoman farmer (de Neufville and Barton, 1987) or the 
English myth of the green belt (Rydin and Myerson, 1989). As with the earlier, 
symbolic interactionist work, however, this research focuses on individual myths or 
problem areas, and does not attempt to tackle wider issues of housing policy 
causation. 
Kemeny (1992) represents an attempt to delineate a more explicit and general 
theoretical culturalism in housing studies, and this will be assessed in detail in the 
next section. His concept of hegemony, based on Gramsci's work, is particularly 
important. Hegemony is defined as "the ability of the members of a social group to 
impose their definitions of reality upon the other members of a society, such that their 
definition constitutes the taken-for-granted assumptions that underlie everyday action, 
and, most importantly, informs the manner in which social life is organised" (Kemeny, 
1992, p. 102). Neither the constituting of underlying assumptions nor the 
informing of social organisation can be fully understood in terms of personal 
relations between agents, so the identification of a hegemony involves the discovery 
of a distinct, culturally-determined layer of reality. 
On the basis of the above outline of four types of explanation, it is possible to 
identify a certain system of relations between them. The focus of this system lies in 
the sphere of ontology, although, by implication, epistemology is also highly 
relevant. For all explanations of housing policy, reality consists of social relations, 
and possibly also relations between social relations. For all explanations, social 
relations are all contingent. Relations between social relations, however, are either 
necessary or contingent, and necessary relations are either analytically necessary or 
synthetically necessary. An explanation which posits only social relations is an 
explanation in terms of systems of actors. An explanation which sees reality as 
composed of social relations and contingent relations between social relations is a 
culturalist or constructivist explanation. An explanation in terms of analytically 
necessary relations between social relations is hypothetico-deductivist. And finally, 
an explanation in terms of synthetically necessary relations is a realist one. Since all 
relations must be either necessary or contingent, and if necessary, they must be 
either analytic or synthetic, I claim that the typology of explanations outlined above 
is exhaustive. 
Similarly with epistemology. Knowledge can be founded on induction or deduction, 
synthetic logic (transcendental, dialectical or abductive) or imaginative construction. 
There are no other possible options, although of course new sub-divisions 
of these categories may be possible. Inductive logic and epistemology are associated 
with explanations in terms of systems of actors, deductive logic and epistemology 
with hypothetico-deductive explanations, synthetic logic and transcendental or 
dialectical epistemology with realist explanation, and imaginative construction with 
culturalist explanation. These conclusions are summarised in Table 1 below. 
Table 1. Typology of explanations 
Type of explanation 
"Systems of actors" 
Hypothetico-deductive 
Realist 
Culturalist 
Ontology 
Social relations 
Analytically necessary relations 
between social relations 
Synthetically necessary relations 
between social relations 
Contingent relations between 
social relations 
Logic/epistemology 
Inductive 
Deductive 
Synthetic 
(transcendental or dialectical) 
Constructive 
EVALUATING EXPLANATIONS OF HOUSING POLICY 
This section is concerned with the evaluation of the four types of explanation 
identified in the previous section. Starting with systems of actors explanations, 
problems inherent to the approach are outlined, whose resolution is attempted by 
the other three types of explanation. Misunderstandings of the hypothetico-deductive 
approach are then dealt with, and the work of Dunleavy in particular is briefly 
reassessed in the light of its own theoretical assumptions. This is followed by a more 
detailed critique of regulation theory and its application to housing, which is 
intended to expose serious weaknesses in recent expositions from a realist perspective. 
Finally, as an example of perhaps the most developed application of a 
culturalist approach to housing to date, the work of Kemeny is discussed, as a 
means towards identifying the general problems associated with such an approach. 
(1) Explanations in terms of systems of actors 
The first problem with systems of actors explanations is that although most housing 
policy writers have leaned towards elite theory rather than pluralism, they have 
differed as to the nature and degree of importance of different elite groups. It seems 
unlikely that this could be due to differences in the types of housing policy being 
considered because of the considerable overlap among housing policies of different 
types. It is more probable that it results from assumptions made about elite 
determination which are insufficiently supported by evidence. Balchin (1989), for 
example, does not seriously test his assumption that housing policy is (entirely?) 
determined by the governing party. In contrast, Dunleavy (1981) has argued, with 
considerable evidential support, that "ministerial or parliamentary involvement was 
negligible" (p. 186) in the public housing apparatus which was responsible for the 
high-rise housing boom. Instead, Dunleavy stresses the role of the construction 
industry and professional groups in determining policy on high-rise housing provision. 
Far from seeing these groups as alternative elites, however, Dunleavy 
questions the whole systems of actors approach on which elite theory depends. 
For Dunleavy, the public housing apparatus is more than a system of actors, 
whether those actors be politicians (giving rise to voluntarist explanations), administrators 
(giving rise to managerialist explanations) or construction capitalists 
(giving rise to instrumentalist economistic explanations). It also, and more importantly, 
involves impersonal structural relations (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 187). In 
Dunleavy's own words: "our research has shown empirically how diffuse social 
class pressures and specific influence-exerting activity by private firms could come to 
set an influential ideological context for the development of state policy, without in 
any way positing the conscious pursuit of either of these interests by decision-makers" 
(Dunleavy, 1981, p. 190). Dunleavy leaves open the question of whether these 
structural forces are real in the realist's sense, or socially constructed in the 
culturalist's sense. 
If Dunleavy's arguments are correct, explanations in terms of systems of actors 
must inevitably be partial and relatively superficial. In particular, the approach does 
not deal with the argument that in order to explain why actors behave as they do 
it is necessary to go beyond the form and content of the activity itself to consider 
the structural context of that activity. This is why Ball and Harloe (1992), for 
example, are correct to say that the concept of structure of housing provision "does 
not of itself 'explain' any housing issue" (p. 4). A structure of housing provision is 
essentially a system of actors, and needs to be systematically related to a wider 
context in order to produce deeper and more comprehensive explanations. In 
contrast to the systems of actors approach, the other three approaches all attempt 
to do this, though in characteristically different ways. 
(2) Hypothetico-deductive explanations 
This approach sees policy outputs (such as the level of state housing provision) as 
logical consequences of specific combinations of structural variables (such as party 
control, condition of housing stock, administrative structure of government, and 
system of housing subsidy). These variables include groups of "actors" (such as 
political elites), but they can also be ordered sets of social relations (such as 
Dunleavy's "national local government system"). The method adopted by this 
approach is then to identify which patterning of input variables is most closely 
correlated with the policy outputs which are to be explained. Dunleavy in particular 
identifies a complex configuration of inputs into the housing policy process which 
includes a socio-economic background, a structure of nationally determined perceptions 
of situations and appropriate public housing responses to those situations, a 
system of central-local government relations, and a pattern of movements of capital 
(Dunleavy, 1981, pp. 347-8). The structure of nationally determined perceptions is 
particularly significant because, for Dunleavy, "actors formulating policy did so 
within a context effectively pre-structured by the ideological positions adopted by the 
design professions, central government, the construction industry, and the national 
local government system" (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 348). The policy of high-rise housing 
provision therefore derived immediately from a political culture created by a 
number of different elites operating within a variety of overlapping social structures. 
For Dunleavy, the input configuration as a whole represents the structural determinant of the policy 
output, and it is therefore implicit in his approach that the output 
is a logical consequence of the input. 
The hypothetico-deductive approach has been widely misunderstood. Realists, for 
example, have criticised the "systems approach" version of it on the grounds that: 
"The actual social processes involved in housing provision are ignored in favour of 
correlating necessarily isolated variables" (Dickens et al., 1985, p. 158). This criticism 
is valid in relation to those who have interpreted the approach as a comparative 
statistical exercise (for example, Pinch, 1978). The variables identified within this 
approach, however, do not have to be isolated from one another: as Dunleavy has 
shown, they may well be structurally and logically interrelated. Indeed, for Dunleavy, 
it is this interrelatedness which actually explains the policy output. Dickens et al. 
(1985), however, miss this crucial point: in spite of Dunleavy's emphasis on the key 
influence of the political culture, they accuse him of minimising the role of national 
and local politics (Dickens et al, 1985, p. 160), and despite his avowed belief in 
structural determination they attribute to him a crudely instrumentalist position, 
describing him as "having plumped for an explanation of national policy in terms of 
large-scale industrial influence" (Dickens et al., 1985, p. 160). 
The hypothetico-deductive approach has also been misunderstood by those 
writing from a culturalist or constructivist perspective. Kemeny, for example, 
argues that Dunleavy's position is "essentially non-statist" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 45) in 
relation to housing policy, because of the prominence which Dunleavy gives to the 
influence of factors outside of the state (namely the construction industry and 
design professions) in determining high-rise housing provision. In fact, however, a 
hypothetico-deductive approach cannot be essentially either non-statist or statist, 
and Dunleavy's own account clearly involves reference to both intra-state and 
extra-state forces. Admittedly, Dunleavy's concept of structural determination is 
insufficiently clear, and therefore liable to misinterpretation, but his work could 
reasonably be represented as an attempt to demonstrate a process of "social 
construction of hegemony" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 117) in the provision of mass housing, 
and therefore possibly compatible with Kemeny's own approach. 
The real problems with the hypothetico-deductive approach do not lie with its 
alleged non-statism or its alleged failure to grasp the "reality" of housing processes. 
In fact, the ontological and epistemological openness of this approach can be 
represented as a positive advantage in comparison with realism (see the argument 
later in this section). At the same time, however, this openness can be interpreted 
as vagueness or ambiguity with respect to fundamental explanatory concepts. 
Dunleavy's concepts of "economic and ideological systems" (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 
183) and "non-local structural forces" (Dunleavy, 1981, p. 346), for example, are 
insufficiently precise for their intended theoretical task. It is not clear how actions 
actually spring from such structural determinants, and even the distinction between 
explanans and explanandum itself becomes blurred. The policy of high-rise housing 
provision, for example, is seen both as an effect of a specific configuration of 
structural forces and as an element of such a configuration. (The two positions are 
not necessarily incompatible, but they need to be consciously reconciled, for 
example by appropriate definitions of causality and structural relatedness—see, for 
example, the discussion of culturalist arguments below). Above all, it can be argued 
that it is the policies which are isolated in the hypothetico-deductive approach. 
Dunleavy's adherence to what he terms an "issue-based" approach (Dunleavy, 
1981), for instance, means that to some extent he separates the issue of high-rise 
housing provision from its social context. Arbitrary cut-off points are selected in the 
policy-practice continuum, leading inevitably to a partial and distorted picture of the 
set of overlapping networks of housing policy relations. Considered as a structural 
element of this set, the policy of high-rise housing provision needs to be assessed in 
terms of its wider policy connections and more lasting historical significance. 
(3) Realist explanations 
Realism has a number of advantages in comparison with the two other approaches 
so far identified. For realists, a systems of actors approach can never be adequate 
for explanatory purposes because it does not take account of the real social relations 
which enable the actors' performance. The drama that we see played out on the 
policy stage cannot be understood without placing it in the wider context of social 
and political theatre. As for the hypothetico-deductive approach, realists point out 
that similar outputs can be produced by quite different inputs, so in order to explain 
any given output it is not sufficient to show that it is logically implied by a particular 
input (or by a particular configuration of structural forces or whatever): it is also 
necessary to identify the "real" relations between inputs and outputs. Dickens et al. 
(1985), for example, claim that although Sheffield and Smallburgh both had a high 
level of council housing provision, this similarity of output was produced by quite 
different configurations of class relations. A hypothetico-deductive approach might 
well have stopped at a more superficial level of analysis, interpreting the lack of 
variation in local policy simply as evidence of the relatively much greater importance 
of national policy. 
As explained in the last section, regulation theory is an example of a particularly 
well-developed realist theory. It establishes the clear superiority of realism over 
explanations in terms of either systems of actors or deductions from externally 
selected or constructed hypotheses. It starts with realities which are highly abstract 
and relatively simple such as the commodity form, the wage relation and the state, 
and by the method of articulation (Jessop, 1982), attempts to explain realities which 
are more concrete and relatively more complex such as regimes of accumulation, 
national modes of growth and conjunctural crises (in order of increasing concrétisation 
and complexification—Jessop, 1990). There are, however, serious problems with 
regulation theory, which reflect more general underlying problems with the realist 
approach. 
Ontologically, regulation theory holds that there are "real causal mechanisms" 
(Jessop, 1990, p. 188) which produce the tendencies and counter-tendencies of capital 
accumulation, but the nature of these mechanisms is never specified in precise and 
unambiguous terms. Regulation theory therefore leaves itself vulnerable to the charge 
of structural-functionalism (Clarke, 1988). In addition, critics have expressed 
scepticism concerning the reality of regulationist regimes of accumulation (Tomaney, 
1990). In response to such critics, the Fordist and post-Fordist regimes have tended 
to assume the status of ideal types rather than real structures of social relations (Jessop, 
1988). If these regimes are no more than ideal types, however, the sense in which they 
can be said to produce real state policies becomes unclear. As Jessop himself admits: 
"unless one examines the mediation of regulation in and through specific social practices 
and forces, regulation will either go unexplained or will be explained in terms of 
'speculative' structuralist categories" (Jessop, 1990, p. 204). In reply to Clarke's 
accusations, the causal primacy of the class struggle is typically acknowledged (Jessop, 
1990, p. 191), but the nature of class struggle itself is left unanalysed. 
Similarly, and this applies to regulationist epistemology as well as ontology, the 
notion of level of abstraction, and the dynamics of transition from one level to 
another, are insufficiently clear. Whereas the contradictory logic of capital accumulation, 
for example, appears to exist at the highest level of abstraction, the class 
struggle which is articulated with that logic seems to operate at all levels—and yet 
at the same, time the concept of class struggle is generally assumed to be of a 
relatively concrete character. The regulationist ontology of class relations is therefore 
particularly confused. 
The confused character of regulationist ontology does not, however, invalidate the 
realist approach as such. It could just be that the particular causal mechanisms 
assumed by regulationists have not been shown to be correct (Jessop, 1990, p. 207, 
footnote 12). On reflection, though, there would appear to be something inherently 
problematic about the concept of real causal powers existing at a level which is 
different from the one in which they are actually realised. The argument seems to 
take us back to a pre-Humean state where the notion of causality remains resolutely 
unpacked. The alienation of structure from agency (or struggle) is, according to 
Marx (1970, pp. 71-81—the fetishism of commodities), created by capitalist social 
relations, but the realist approach seems only to reproduce this alienation in thought 
and then seek ways by which it might be abolished (again, only in thought). 
Epistemologically, the failures of regulation theory reflect and reinforce the 
flaws in its ontology. The theory claims that the "laws of motion" of capital in 
general can be known through the analysis of specific conjunctures (Jessop, 1990, 
p. 163). The regulationist concepts of regime of accumulation, mode of regulation, 
etc., operate at this relatively more concrete and complex level (Jessop, 1988, p. 
162). The regulationist accounts, however, whatever their merits in other respects, 
entirely fail to establish any laws of motion of capital in general operating at the 
level of actuality, but only patterns in the development of particular social forms. 
Methodologically, regulationists (and realists generally) argue that a realist approach 
is necessary for theory construction (Bhaskar, 1978; Jessop, 1990, p. 207). 
There are many examples from the history of science, however, which appear to 
contradict this, the best of which is probably the construction of quantum theory 
(Jammer, 1966; Forman, 1979; Hendry, 1980). Nevertheless, realism does have a 
strong following among scientists, and this is largely for methodological reasons. As 
one leading scientist has put it: "almost every working scientist is a realist—at least 
during working hours" (Barrow, 1988, p. 16), and Barrow also suggests that this 
tendency to realism may be naturally selected. 
The above problems with regulation theory are evident in its applications to 
housing processes. Although these applications clearly involve "the mediation of 
regulation in and through specific social practices and forces" (Jessop, 1990, p. 204), 
they do not explain the nature of the regulation itself. Chouinard, for example, does 
not succeed in explaining why the cooperative housing movement in Canada was 
unable to oppose the reproduction of dominant, market-based performance criteria 
within the state, except by reference to the dominance of the ideology of "abstract 
consumerism" (Chouinard, 1990, p. 1442). The source of this dominance in Canadian 
class relations (or in the specific character of the prevailing Canadian 
hegemony) is not adequately identified, with the result that the mode of regulation 
which reproduces the marginal position of cooperatives in the delivery of assisted 
housing is not clearly specified or explained. In contrast, Florida and Feldman 
(1988)'s account of suburbanisation in the USA is more convincing, because it 
does delineate the nature of the "class accord" (p. 192) which is said to have 
been responsible for rapid postwar suburban growth. Unfortunately, however, this 
class accord is represented as a structural feature of US society rather than an 
inherently unstable, uneasy truce between conflicting social forces. Consequently, 
Florida and Feldman's explanation of postwar US housing looks structural functionalist, 
with suburbanisation being seen as functionally necessary to complete 
the structuralist cycle of production-exchange-consumption: "The postwar housing 
system was an integral component of US Fordism's 'mode of regulation' since it 
provided an important mechanism through which production and consumption were 
integrated and the productivity-wage-consumption circuit completed" (Florida and 
Feldman, 1988, p. 198). 
Like Florida and Feldman and Chouinard, Kennett (1992, 1993) sees marginalisation 
in the housing market as produced by modes of regulation. In this case, 
however, the emphasis is on the "Keynesian Welfare State System" (Jessop, 1989, 
p. 267) as the means by which Fordist regimes of accumulation were extended 
throughout society. The decline of Fordist accumulation regimes is then associated 
with the decline of Keynesian modes of regulation, resulting in "greater marginalisation 
and insecurity" (Kennett, 1992, p. 15), of which increasing numbers of 
homeless people is one expression. According to Kennett, the demise of the 
"Keynesian city" has only "accompanied" (Kennett, 1992, p. 13) the restructuring 
of capital, so she is not necessarily arguing that there is a causal relationship 
between the two. Nevertheless, that is the impression conveyed, and if the alleged 
relationship is not of a causal character, it is not clear what its nature might be 
(some form of complementarity, perhaps?). In particular, Kennett fails to consider 
the extent to which Fordism might itself have produced marginalisation in the 
housing market in the first place. It seems strange, for example, that Florida and 
Feldman should attribute inner-city marginalisation to the effects of Fordism 
(because of suburbanisation), and similarly Chouinard with respect to the marginalisation 
of the cooperative housing movement, while Kennett in contrast should 
attempt to explain housing marginality by reference to the transition to postFordism. 
As with Florida and Feldman, there would appear to be an underlying 
structural-functionalism: the retrenchment of the Keynesian welfare state is seen to 
be functionally necessary in order to restore the conditions for capital accumulation 
(Kennett, 1992, p. 10). In addition, the responsibility for carrying out the retrenchment 
is attributed to "the emergence of right-wing governments" (Kennett, 1992, p. 
10), and this signifies an explanation in terms of systems of actors. When specific 
social practices and forces are examined more closely, therefore, the nature of the 
regulation which is said to be mediated by them seems to dissolve in a stew of 
functionalism, voluntarism and empiricism. 
The application of regulation theory to housing, then, has lacked concepts which 
are meaningful and effective at this level. Within the realist approach, however, the 
only non-regulationist housing account has been that of Dickens et al. (1985). 
Although this account has been criticised, somewhat unfairly, for its alleged 
emphasis on the primacy of production relations (Ball and Harloe, 1992), it remains 
probably the most outstanding application of a realist approach in housing. 
Broadly speaking, it attempts to explain patterns of national and local state housing 
performance in terms of differences in national and local class relations. Unlike 
in Florida and Feldman's account, these relations are seen as fragmented and 
dynamically changing causal mechanisms (uneven development) rather than as 
all-pervasive structural entities. Nevertheless, Dickens et al. fail to explain exactly 
how such relations exert their causal effects: the relations between spatially and 
temporally defined class relations and national and local state apparatuses remain 
unclear. As a result (and ironically in view of their realism), Dickens et al. have 
been accused by Kemeny of instrumentalism, that is of having "a view of the state 
as being largely, if not entirely, the passive tool of wider societal interests" (Kemeny, 
1992, p. 47). The notion of class forces operating within state apparatuses is 
generally absent from Dickens et al.'s account (contrast, for example, Cousins, 
1987'—although her account has little to say about housing). Instead, the reality of 
class relations is interpreted in terms of geographical and historical contingency. 
(4) Culturalist explanations 
In considering culturalist or constructivist perspectives, I concentrate on the work 
of Kemeny (1992). Constructivism has several advantages over the other three 
approaches. From a constructivist point of view, a system of actors approach has 
merit insofar as it identifies patterns of interaction among social groups which are 
responsible for the production of the policy process. Such an approach, however, 
seems to be incapable of conceptualizing hegemony, as we saw in the last section. 
There appears to be a sense in which the processes of constituting underlying 
assumptions and informing social organisation operate at a different level from that 
of a system of actors: a level of discourse and emotionally-charged meanings. 
Insofar as they can be said to exist at all, systems of actors are seen as "embedded" 
(Kemeny, 1992, p. 154) in a wider social structure. 
Dunleavy's hypothetico-deductive approach is, in comparison, closer to a constructivist 
position. The salience of nationally determined perceptions in Dunleavy's 
account, together with his claims concerning the ideological prestructuring of the 
context of policy formation, are arguably initial attempts at an articulation of how 
the hegemony responsible for high-rise housing provision in Britain was established 
and maintained. For constructivists, the main problem with Dunleavy's approach is 
that an issue-based perspective is simply too narrow to grasp the nature of any 
particular hegemony, and consequently results in one-sidedness and ahistoricism. A 
constructivist would argue that such limitations can be overcome by a better 
understanding of how the structure of social relations in which high-rise housing 
provision is embedded was produced on the basis of a particular hegemony or 
hegemonies (relevant ideologies, for example, would have been collectivism and 
modernism, articulated to a hegemony mobilized to achieve accelerating economic 
growth). 
As for realism, it is rejected by culturalists as essentialist and value-neutral. The 
world is not seen as having a structure which is independent of human activity; on 
the contrary, for constructivists the distinction between "real" and "ideal" worlds 
is itself a human construction. Consequently, the realist distinction between necessary 
and contingent (social) relations is invalid from a culturalist point of view. 
Culturalists would also argue that the divorce of action from structure is inevitable 
for a realist, because the alleged contingency of action can never be reconciled with 
the alleged necessity of structure, no matter how much the dialectic is invoked in 
order to accomplish this impossible task (Jessop, 1990). In contrast, culturalists 
hold that structure and struggle are linked through what could be called "moving 
discourse", that is modes of discourse in which powerful imagery and rhetoric 
motivate human action. It then almost goes without saying that culturalists reject 
realist epistemology as well as realist ontology: culturalist epistemology appears to 
make possible a unity of theory (discourse) and practice (action) which forever 
eludes the grasp of a realist, who seeks "laws of history" only, apparently, in order 
to escape them. 
Kemeny's culturalist theory, outlined in the previous section, is fairly embryonic, 
and could be developed much further in explaining the social construction of 
housing policy. Potentially fruitful applications include processes of bureaucratisation 
and centralisation (Houlihan, 1988), powerful ideologies such as that of the 
postwar housing shortage (Malpass and Murie, 1990), or the ideologies associated 
with the "politics of tenure" (Ball, 1983). Even so, it is possible to identify problems 
with Kemeny's approach, which in part reflect problems with culturalist perspectives 
more generally. 
The first problem is ontological. It can be accepted that social reality is constructed 
by human activity, but this activity is physical, as well as intellectual and 
emotional. Ideologies, as products of intellectual and emotional activity, tend to 
become detached from material products, but this is arguably only a consequence 
of the separation of mental from manual labour in class societies. Ideologies, such 
as Kemeny's privatism/collectivism couple, appear as free-floating abstractions, but 
in fact they are rooted in social relations (in the case of the privatism/collectivism 
couple, these are the social relations of competition and cooperation respectively). 
There is no political or ideological "superstructure" divorced from an economic 
"base", nor does it make sense to talk of ideology or the state as having autonomy 
of some kind in relation to social structure. Both ideology and the state are simply 
parts of a socially constructed reality, and the problem is to explain the alienation 
of these parts from the reality, not to theorise the alienation as a given. In short, the 
task is to explain how functionally-undifferentiated human activity results in 
apparently autonomous functionally separated social institutions. The achievement 
and reproduction of hegemony (which overcomes the alienation of state from social 
structure) requires pre-eminence in terms of material power (for example, control of 
the armed forces and the commanding heights of the economy) as well as in modes 
of discourse. 
The second problem, or set of problems, is epistemological. The culturalist 
approach rightly draws attention to the power of myth, rhetoric and media 
imagery, and the relationship of all this to dominant ideologies. The approach 
does not explain, however, how the relative power of different ideologies can be 
evaluated apart from the vague reference to their emotional energy. As a result, 
culturalism does not enable us to know what kind of strategies need to be 
developed in order to establish a dominant ideology in any "key area" (Keiasny, 
1992, p. 94). In addition, Kemeny's attempt to show that housing is such a key 
area for hegemony because of "its embeddedness in broader social issues" (Kemeny, 
1992, p. 127) is unconvincing. The problem here lies with the concept of 
embeddedness, which is insufficiently clear. For Kemeny, the household-dwelling 
relationship seems to be at the centre of processes of socio-spatial structuring, but 
it is not clear if such structuring processes do actually have a centre in any 
meaningful sense. Indeed, Kemeny's recourse to concepts of locality, residence and 
socio-spatial dimension suggest that he has not effectively distanced himself from a 
realist position, in which social relations are embedded or centred in spatial 
reality. For a constructivist, however, space is itself socially constructed, and a due 
consideration of this point should lead on to a discussion of localist, regionalist, 
nationalist, and possibly continentalist ideologies. All such ideologies, especially 
nationalism, are of considerable importance for understanding the social construction 
of hegemony and political dominance, and Kemeny could have usefully 
referred to the work of Anderson (1983), Corrigan and Sayer (1985), Gellner 
(1983), Hutchinson (1987), and Smith (1991), all of whom, in different ways, 
have examined culturalist perspectives on the social construction of dominant 
nationalist ideologies. In comparison with the extraordinary emotive power of 
nationalism, the ideologies of privatism and collectivism seem of only secondary 
importance. Indeed, one of the crucial strengths of nationalism is that it appears to 
combine both privatist and collectivist ideals (through the themes of "Family" and 
"Nation"). 
Nationalism, of course, is more than an ideology: it also involves forms 
of economic and political organisation. The limitations of a culturalist perspective 
appear in the tendency to focus on ideologies (such as nationalism, racism, 
religious fundamentalism) and to neglect issues of class and gender in the 
formation and transmission of such ideologies. For culturalists, therefore, the main 
problem lies with making sense of class/gender relations (and also domestic 
relations—Somerville, 1994). For this reason, culturalists such as Kemeny have 
been labelled by realists as neo-Gramscian pluralists (Burnham, 1991). 
Kemeny has applied his theory of hegemony and residence to Swedish housing 
policy in particular. He argues that the ruling social democratic party in Sweden 
historically followed what Jessop has called a "one-nation" strategy (Jessop, 1982), 
incorporating the capitalist class, and expressed through the myth of "the people's 
home" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 131), and this led to an emphasis on state provision of 
housing and other welfare goods. In Kemeny's view, "the People's Home is a clear 
example of a myth in the transposing of the family idyll and the ideal of the 
home.. .on to how a moral and proper society should function: as one big happy 
family, ensconced within the four walls of its home" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 132). 
Strangely, however, Kemeny does not comment on how such a myth excludes as 
well as includes, in short its implicit national chauvinism and racism, to which other 
writers on the welfare state have drawn attention (Jacobs, 1985; Cohen, 1985). 
Consequently, the nationalist character of the myth has been understood in only a 
culturalist sense, and its wider social construction in relation to Swedish economic 
corporatism and political non-alignment has not been discussed. As with the 
structures-of-housing-provision approach, one is left with the impression that 
Swedish housing policy has been redescribed, admittedly in an interesting and 
thought-provoking fashion, but not really explained. Why should it be, for example, 
that state action to support collective provision is associated with the encouragement 
of (non-collective) female wage-labour (Kemeny, 1992, p. 148)? And why 
should state action to create collectivist residential structure actually prevent the 
"social construction of deep collectivism" (Kemeny, 1992, p. 149)? Could it perhaps 
have something to do with the fact that the causation of housing policy is not only 
ideological or cultural, but also involves a variety of interrelated social structures of 
which residence is (possibly) only one? 
CONCLUSION 
Reviewing all four types of explanation together, it seems reasonable to argue that 
some are better than others, in some sense which remains to be fully explicated. 
Explanations in terms of systems of actors, for example, are at a more superficial 
level than explanations of the other three types, because they do not take explicit 
account of relations between social relations. This does not mean, however, that 
systems of actors explanations cannot be valid in their own terms, that is if they 
identify and find evidential support for logics or patterns of social relations.. In 
addition, precisely because they do operate at a different level, explanations in terms 
of systems of actors may well be consistent with hypothetico-deductivism, realism or 
culturalism. 
In contrast to systems of actors explanations, the other three types of explanation 
are not all mutually compatible. Relations (between social relations) cannot be both 
necessary and contingent, nor can they be both analytic and synthetic. The explanations 
therefore cannot all be correct, although they could all be wrong. Hypotheticodeductivism, 
first of all, seeks to select those relations between social relations which 
are seen to be analytically necessary, that is those whose interrelatedness can 
be demonstrated, through logical and linguistic analysis, as logically necessary— 
for example, the relationship between Dunleavy's "non-local structural forces" 
(Dunleavy, 1981, p. 346) and the national local government system. Hypotheticodeductive 
explanations assume that housing policies can be "read off" from a set of 
rules for the combination of relevant symbolic inputs, and from this it follows that 
the way to make theoretical progress is to explicate the rules of combination 
(analytical method). As we have seen, this approach has important merits for policy 
analysis, but it is inevitably partial and one-sided, and in practice suffers from 
ambiguity and from arbitrariness in hypothesis selection. It should be noted, 
however, that hypothetico-deductivists do not claim that all relations between social 
relations are analytic, so hypothetico-deductivism is not necessarily incompatible 
with realism or culturalism. Because of its ontological ambiguity, however, the 
position of hypothetico-deductivism in relation to realism and culturalism is none too 
clear: the traditional association of hypothetico-deductivism with conventionalism 
(Nagel, 1961) would suggest a lack of sympathy with realism, but this does not entail 
an acceptance of a culturalist position. For hypothetico-deductivists, therefore, 
relations between social relations which are not analytically necessary are highly 
likely to be contingent, but not necessarily so. 
Realism and culturalism are clearly inconsistent with each other. They make 
contradictory claims about the "deep structure" of social reality. Realism asserts that 
there exist relations between social relations whose necessity cannot be reduced to 
logical or analytical necessity, whereas culturalism sees all relations between social 
relations as contingently constructed (the hypothetico-deductivist's analytic relations 
could be contingently constructed, but the realist's synthetic ones cannot). My view 
is that realism is incorrect. No matter how clear, rigorous or comprehensive realist 
explanations may be, they all tend to drive a permanent wedge between structure and 
action, necessity and contingency, and cause and effect. This is a serious, and 
probably irredeemable, flaw, and I suspect that the synthetic necessities which realists 
identify (for example relations between social classes) do not in fact exist. 
Finally, culturalists argue that relations between social relations are revealed not 
by means of a spurious transcendental or dialectical "logic" but by a hermeneutic 
or interpretive approach which proceeds through exploration of a progressively 
deepening and widening semantic content. According to this approach, even 
analytical or syntactical relations are explicable in terms of semantics—it is the 
"logic of meaning" which determines the rules of symbolic combination. Culturalist explanations are 
therefore powerful with respect to the semantic underpinnings 
of social relatedness, thus exposing the limitations of the other types of explanation. 
Nevertheless, they lack criteria for the assessment of semantic or ideological power, 
and consequently appear to overemphasise the importance of ideology in social 
construction ideological centring appears to substitute for a coherent unity of 
theory and practice. This is a fault, however, which can be corrected, for example 
by means of a due consideration for the material basis of particular hegemonies: 
this would lead to the development of a social constructivist perspective which 
avoids the pitfalls of ideologism and culturalism. Ironically, though, a recognition 
of the deep contingency of relations between social relations leads inexorably to a 
new appreciation of the value of explanations in terms of systems of actors (in 
which, presumably, the different systems are related to each other contingently). 
APPENDIX: TYPOLOGIES OF HOUSING POLICY 
Table 1. The "Structure of Housing Provision" model 
Types of Policy (related to phases Policy Examples (in Britain) 
of the housing provision process) 
1) Promotion-related Planning restraint, partnership schemes 
2) Investment-related Housing investment programmes. Building 
Society regulation 
3) Construction-related Building Regulations for housing, JCT contracts 
4) Distribution or exchange-related Allocations policy, Right-to-Buy 
5) Consumption-related Mortgage interest tax relief, local housing management 
Table 2. The "Administration" Model 
Types of Policy (corresponding to Policy Examples (in Britain) 
legal-political or 
administrative-technical divisions) 
1) Physical-related Health and safety regulations, repairs systems 
2) Tenure-related Landlord-tenant law, Housing Corporation powers and duties 
3) Finance-related Housing Revenue Account regulation, council tax 
4) Management-related Decentralisation, equal opportunities in housing 
5) Welfare-related "Special needs" provision, homelessness policy 
Table 3. A Hybrid Model—a tenure-focused network of policy relations 
Type of network Examples in owner-occupied tenure Examples in rented tenures 
1) Promotional Developers-builders-estate agents Housing Corporation-housing 
association-builders 
2) Financial Building Societies/banks-money Treasury-local authority-Public 
markets Works Loans Board-money 
markets 
3) Legal Property law-solicitors-conveyancers Housing law-local government 
law-landlord/tenant law 
4) Managerial Kinship network Councillors-housing managers tenants 
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